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Abstract This paper presents a retrospective view of Mancur Olson’s The Logic of
Collective Action. The paper’s primary purpose is to investigate the validity of Olson’s
propositions concerning group size, group composition, and institutional design. This
purpose is accomplished by drawing on the literature and the paper’s game-theoretic
representations. Key considerations behind the validity of his propositions concern benefit
rivalry, the aggregation technology, strategic assumptions, and participation costs. The
difference between public good and commons games is also an essential consideration.
Generally, Olson’s propositions fare best for benefit rivalry, a summation aggregator, Nash
behavior, and positive participation costs. Because his propositions are true in many im-
portant real-world situations, the book remains highly relevant. Efforts to find exceptions
to Olson’s propositions have served to further our understanding of collective action.
Keywords Collective action  Exploitation hypothesis  Selective incentives 
Public goods  Commons
JEL Classification D70  H41  D62
1 Introduction
In 1965, Mancur Olson published The Logic of Collective Action (henceforth, Logic),
which is one of the most influential books in the study of public choice. By questioning
whether large groups could further their collective interests, Olson (1965) cast group
behavior in an unfamiliar light to many—e.g. political scientists and sociologists who
viewed groups as necessarily furthering the interests of their members. His provocative
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question resonated with public choice scholars, who argued that political agents (e.g.
officeholders, voters, lobbies, or political parties) did not always foster collective welfare.1
Within the field of economics, Logic influenced the study of key entities in virtually every
subfield of economics—e.g. labor unions in labor economics, charities in public eco-
nomics, cartels in industrial organization, polluters in environmental economics, trading
blocs in international economics, sports leagues in sports economics, jurisdictions in re-
gional economics, and alliances in defense economics.
Even though Olson’s (1965) group propositions are not airtight, Logic has had a
tremendous impact on the study of group behavior. At last count, Logic has amassed
almost 29,000 google scholar cites. The book’s message transcended economics and al-
tered thinking in sociology, anthropology, political science, and public policy.
Collective action arises when the efforts of two or more individuals or agents (e.g.
countries) are required to accomplish an outcome. For instance, oncoming ships at sea
must have a convention for avoiding collisions. Additionally, collective action is necessary
to attain herd immunity through vaccinations in order to eradicate a disease. Globally,
collective action is also required to curb money laundering. Logic demonstrated that in-
dividual rationality is not sufficient to achieve collective rationality (Sandler 1992, p. 3).
Thus, individuals may pursue self-interested actions that do not further the best interests of
the group.2 This recognition stands in stark contrast to Adam Smith’s invisible hand, where
the pursuit of each individual’s self-interest in competitive markets bolsters collective
well-being. Clearly, Olson’s notion of collective action failure is not referring to the
provision of private goods in the presence of complete information and unfettered markets;
rather, it is concerned with public goods, externalities (i.e. uncompensated interdepen-
dencies), and the commons. These latter concerns mean that collective action involves
strategic rational choice, better known as game theory (Dixit et al. 2009). In these three
market-failure situations, the action of one agent influences and hinges on the decisions of
other agents. For a pure public good, one person’s contribution automatically benefits other
potential contributors owing to nonrivalry and nonexcludability of benefits. Thus, one
contributor is likely to reduce his or her contributions as others contribute more to the
public good. Similar strategic interactions characterize generators of external benefits or
costs, or exploiters in a commons with open access (Ostrom 1990).
If many of Olson’s (1965) propositions are not universally valid (Dougherty 2003;
Ferguson 2013; Ostrom 2000; Pecorino 2015; Sandler 1992), then why has Logic had such
a lasting and profound influence on thought? There are a number of reasons. First, many of
Olson’s propositions are valid in numerous scenarios with important real-world counter-
parts, such as the voluntary provision of a pure public good (Bergstrom et al. 1986; Cornes
and Sandler 1984, 1996). Second, Olson’s bold sweeping maxims taunted readers to find
exceptions and, as consequence, to define better boundaries for the practice of collective
action (Cornes and Sandler 1984; Esteban and Ray 2001; Ferguson 2013; Marwell and
Oliver 1993; Pecorino 2015; Pecorino and Temimi 2008). As Logic’s reputation grew,
1 Dougherty (2003) presented a fascinating historical view of collective action traced back to the writings of
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and others. In particular, Dougherty
defended the originality of Olson’s (1965) Logic in terms of its innovative applications, the exploitation
hypothesis, and asymmetric benefits.
2 For example, in a Prisoners’ Dilemma game, agents’ use of their (rational) dominant strategy results in an
outcome with inferior payoffs compared to cooperative outcomes. As a consequence, collective action
problems are often tied to Prisoners’ Dilemmas (Hardin 1982). This connection can be taken too far because
other game structures can be associated with collective action problems (Sandler 1992; Taylor 1987). The
importance of game structures for collective action is demonstrated throughout this paper.
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researchers’ efforts and rewards from finding exceptions to Olson’s (1965) maxims took on
greater importance. Had Olson presented well-qualified, airtight propositions, the book
would have had a smaller following, because the necessary assumptions for universal
validity would have placed the book’s analysis beyond the reach of the readerships of
many related disciplines.3 Moreover, these propositions would have applied to a more
limited set of practical problems. Third, greater globalization over the last 50 years ex-
panded the importance of the principles and practice of collective action as more countries
must interact on a wide range of exigencies involving health, security, governance, fi-
nancial stability, trade, and the environment. Fourth, countries and cities have grown in
size and number, thereby increasing the relevancy of collective action within and among
nation-states. Fifth, collective action has assumed novel forms: tracking disease outbreaks,
averting climate change, addressing global financial crises, curtailing transnational ter-
rorism, stemming nuclear weapons proliferation, limiting superbugs (i.e. antibiotic-resis-
tant diseases), and preserving unique habitats. Sixth, technology provides not only new
collective action problems (e.g. control of cyber attacks), but also offers novel means for
recognizing and addressing old collective action problems (e.g. monitoring the spread of
pollutants and pests).
The primary purpose of this paper is to take stock of the current state of knowledge
regarding collective action. To do so, the paper presents the basic propositions of collective
action, contained in Logic. This is done briefly in Sect. 3, after some necessary pre-
liminaries are given in Sect. 2. The remainder of the paper investigates the validity of these
collective action propositions, which concern group size (Sects. 4, 5), group composition
(Sect. 6), and institutional reform recommendations (Sect. 7). The paper identifies some
key factors behind the validity of Olson’s propositions, which include the form of the
agents’ utility functions, the nature of their cost functions, the purity of the public good,
and the technology of aggregation (i.e. how individual contributions affect collective
supply). Other considerations address the underlying strategic assumption and temporal
factors. In terms of strategic aspects, a heavy emphasis is placed on the underlying games
and their representations. Understandably, this paper must be selective in this regard, since
it is not meant to be an exhaustive survey of the study of collective action.4 Section 8
indicates some modern-day applications of collective action in order to highlight Logic’s
continued relevance. Concluding remarks are contained in Sect. 9.
2 Preliminaries
A key topic of collective action concerns the provision of public goods by two or more
providers. At the time of Logic, the classes of public goods corresponded to those based on
two dimensions of publicness—benefit rivalry and nonexcludability. For nonrival benefits,
a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the least, from
the consumption opportunities still available to others from the same unit. For example,
one person’s consumption of cleaner air does not detract from the improved air quality
available to others. Such nonrival benefits result in a market failure because the good’s
3 To gain an appreciation of this claim, see updated propositions in Sandler (1992, pp. 194–198). For
example, an update to Olson’s (1965) group size and suboptimality proposition might read as follows: With
identical individuals and symmetric equilibriums, an increase in group size worsens suboptimality when a
summation technology applies and the cost per unit exceeds the benefit per unit.
4 Thus, the paper does not examine dynamic issues or the role of uncertainty, except tangentially.
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implied zero marginal cost of consumption means that any charges for the good’s use
would result in suboptimality. This follows because some people deriving benefits are
excluded by these charges even though their consumption is costless to society. If no
private way of financing the good is possible, then public provision is needed. The second
property of public goods is nonexcludability of benefits. Once provided, a good with
nonexcludable benefits can be consumed by purchasers and nonpurchasers alike, thereby
leading to free-riding incentives. Both publicness properties can result in suboptimal
provision or market failure as resources are not channeled to their most valued use.
Collective action failure can result because, without a means to finance the good, it may
not be provided. Even if provided, free-rider incentives imply that a suboptimal level of the
good is supplied as providers do not account for the benefits that their provision confers on
others.5 For example, deterrence provided by an alliance’s military arsenal offers nonrival
and nonexcludable benefits to all allies if the promised threat of retaliation is credible
(Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).
When a public good’s benefits display some rivalry and/or excludability, it is an impure
public good. Important classes of such goods include club goods, whose benefits are partly
rival owing to a user-induced reduction in the quantity or quality of the good, known as
congestion or crowding (Buchanan 1965; Sandler and Tschirhart 1980, 1997). Thus, ex-
tending access to the good to additional consumers is not costless, so that a toll, based on
the marginal congestion cost of use, can foster optimal provision (Buchanan 1965; Sandler
2013). The rudiments of club analysis can be found in Olson’s Logic under the notion of
exclusive groups whose memberships must be restricted. Another important case of impure
public goods is that of nonexcludable goods with partly rival benefits. Such goods may
result in a collective action failure as an increase in group size reduces total and per person
benefits, thereby inhibiting provision (Chamberlin 1974; Pecorino 2015).
During the last three decades, a third property of public goods, known as the technology
of aggregation (or aggregation technology) is recognized to influence collective action (see,
e.g. Cornes 1993; Cornes and Sandler 1984; Hirshleifer 1983; Sandler 1997; Vicary 1990).
This third property indicates how individual contributions to the collective good determine
the overall quantity of the good that is available for consumption. In Logic, the standard
summation aggregator is assumed implicitly, such that a contributed unit adds equally to the
aggregate provision of the collective good. As such, individual contributions are perfectly
substitutable for those of other contributors, thereby bolstering free-riding incentives. Three
particular aggregation technologies figure prominently in subsequent discussions. For a
weakest-link public good, the smallest individual contribution fixes the overall provision of a
public good (Hirshleifer 1983). A quarantine against a contagious disease abides by a
weakest-link aggregator because the smallest or least-effective quarantine determines whe-
ther the disease spreads to infect others. Quarantine efforts beyond the minimum do not
provide any additional protection. For a weakest-link public good, no incentive to free ride
emerges, because doing so effectively brings overall provision down to zero. The weakest-
link aggregator bolsters collective action by removing free riding as a desirable strategy, but
it inhibits collective action by giving each potential contributor a possible spoiler role as a
noncontributor. The latter is particularly worrisome for situations wherein some potential
contributors do not have the means to contribute (Sandler 2015; Vicary and Sandler 2002).
A best-shot aggregator is also important for cases in which the largest effort determines
the overall quantity of the collective good. Best-shot public goods include R & D advances,
5 See standard treatments of public goods and market failures, such as Boadway and Bruce (1984) and
Cornes and Sandler (1996).
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assassinating a notorious terrorist, gaining intelligence, or finding a cure to a disease. For
best-shot public goods, efforts and resources must be channeled to the potential provider
who is most apt to succeed. Consequently, coordination is needed to achieve provision and
to avoid wasteful duplicate efforts. This coordination constitutes the required collective
action. A third aggregator is threshold, such that provision of the public good must surpass
some baseline level before benefits accrue to the group (Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Dixit
and Olson 2000; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984; Sandler 1992). For example, fire suppression
efforts must exceed some threshold before any containment is achieved.
Another important preliminary consideration is Olson’s (1965) notion of a privileged
group. The idea refers to at least one individual or coalition whose perceived benefits from
collective action exceed the associated costs, even if these costs are borne solely by the
individual or coalition. If a group is privileged, then some subgroup of actors provides the
collective action that furthers everyone’s well-being. For instance, the US Centers for Dis-
ease Control (CDC) monitors disease outbreaks and isolates new microbes globally as a way
of protecting US citizens. The United States funds the CDC independently even though its
efforts protect people worldwide. At the start of the Cold War, the US nuclear arsenal
protected or privileged Western Europe by deterring further Soviet expansion. Open domain
software is a best-shot public good whose users are privileged by the program’s developer.
Since much of the paper’s arguments are based on game theory, two essential game-
theoretic notions must be introduced. Nash behavior involves each player acting indepen-
dently or in isolation. A Nash equilibrium corresponds to each player choosing its best
response in reaction to the best response(s) of the other player(s). At a Nash equilibrium, no
player unilaterally will change its strategy since it has chosen a best response. Games may
possess many Nash equilibriums, but some may be more desirable than others. Collective
action difficulties may be associated with a variety of game forms, not just the familiar
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Another important game-theoretic concept is that of a dominant
strategy that gives a player a larger payoff regardless of the other players’ strategies.
3 General rules of thumb for collective action
Table 1 draws nine propositions from Olson’s (1965) Logic, which are displayed under
three subgroupings—size of group, group composition, and institutional recommendations.
Table 1 Collective action: general rules of thumb
Size of group
Large groups may not form to provide themselves with the collective good (strong version)
The larger the group, the smaller the collective provision level (strong version)
The larger the group, the greater the inefficiency associated with individual uncoordinated/Nash
behavior (weak version)
Group composition
Larger members with greater endowments bear a disproportionate burden of collective provision
(action) (exploitation hypothesis)
Heterogeneous groups are more apt to achieve some collective action
Homogeneous groups are more apt to form
Institutional recommendations
Collective action is promoted by selective incentives that bolster individual gains
Collective action may be fostered by institutional design—for example, refunds or federated structure
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Pecorino (2015) characterized the first two propositions as the strong versions of the
influence of group size on collective action: large groups may not form or be privileged,
and larger groups are characterized by smaller collective provision. The weak form of the
group size proposition indicates that collective provision is more suboptimal for larger
groups. Olson also advanced three maxims with respect to group composition. The
celebrated exploitation hypothesis says that large (better-endowed) members shoulder a
disportionately heavy burden of collective provision for the small members.6 This hy-
pothesis held for NATO allies until 1964 (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). The last two
composition propositions concern group formation. Potential collectives with members
who possess different tastes and/or endowments are more apt to provide some collective
action, primarily because such differences are apt to result in a privileged group. In
addition, homogeneous collectives are more likely to form owing to minimal participation
costs. Reaching decisions on collective action is less costly when members have similar
means and preferences.
Olson (1965) also offered some institutional recommendations. Selective incentives that
reward providers with private gains foster collective action by raising contributors’ per-
ceived benefits. Moreover, institutions that make individuals’ actions more noticeable to
the group will promote collective action. This is particularly true of federated structures,
such as those used by labor unions (Olson 1965), wherein much of the collective action is
conducted at the local level. At this level, the interacting group is small and individual
contributions are noticed. Other institutional principles were indicated by Olson (1965) and
extended by Ostrom (1990), Schotter (2008), and others.
4 Group size propositions
Olson’s (1965) Logic did not offer a clear model from which his group size maxims followed
(Ostrom 1987; Sandler 1992). In particular, the forms of the participants’ utility and cost
functions never were specified (Esteban and Ray 2001; Pecorino and Temimi 2008).
Moreover, Olson appeared to have in mind a collective good whose benefits are rivalrous.
Olson’s first group size proposition stemmed from his notion that an increase in the size of
the entire collective reduces any subgroup’s share of the group’s benefits from collective
action (Olson 1965, pp. 33–34, 48).7 This result, however, requires that the collective good
possesses rivalrous benefits. For a pure public good, any subgroup’s derived benefits are
independent of the size of the collective. That is, the subgroup’s benefit equals nMRSGy;
where n is the subgroup’s size and MRSGy is an individual’s marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) between the public good (G) and a private numeraire good (y). The subgroup’s
aggregate benefit is invariant to the size of the entire collective when no benefit rivalry is
present. If, however, crowding is implied, then the subgroup’s benefit must be weighted by
some marginal crowding term, which reduces the subgroup’s gains as the collective grows
in size. In so doing, crowding reduces the likelihood that a subgroup derives sufficient
gains to privilege the entire collective as the latter grows in size, which is in keeping with
Olson’s first size maxim.
The second group size proposition is invalid for purely public goods when tastes display
normal income elasticities for the private and public goods (Chamberlin 1974; McGuire
6 The notion of large is never clear in Logic. It may refer to endowments or to population (Vicary 2009).
7 Sandler (1992, pp. 23–27) offered a stylized model for Olson’s analysis based on some of Olson’s notation
and definitions.
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1974). For homogeneous contributors, Chamberlin (1974) showed that the overall con-
tribution to the public good increases to a finite limit as group size increases even though
per person contributions decline. This per person reduction is more than offset by con-
tributions from the new members as group size expands, provided the collective good is
income normal. If, however, the collective good is inferior and/or rival, then Olson’s
second group size maxim may hold.
Subsequently, the private provision of public good analysis supported Chamberlin’s and
McGuire’s view of the second maxim (Andreoni 1988; Bergstrom et al. 1986; Cornes and
Sandler 1984). For this analysis, individual i maximizes utility, Ui, which depends on a
private good, yi, and a pure public good, G. The latter is the sum of the individual i’s




that G ¼ gi þ Gi. The individual’s budget constraint is
yi þ pgi ¼ wi; ð1Þ
where the price of the private good is unity, the price of the public good is p, and individual
i’s income is wi. Hence, each individual faces the following problem,
max
yi;gi
Ui yi; gi þ Gið Þ yi þ pgi ¼ wijf g; ð2Þ
where Gi is treated as a constant owing to the assumed Nash behavior. The associated
first-order conditions (FOCs) include the budget constraint in (1) and
MRSiGy ¼ p: ð3Þ
Equation (3) indicates that each contributor equates his or her marginal benefit from the
public good to the relative price of the public good, thereby ignoring the benefits that his or
her contribution confers on others. This then implies suboptimality because optimality
from the group’s perspective requires that
Xn
i¼1
MRSiGy ¼ p ð4Þ
is satisfied. Thus, the private provision of a public good model supports Olson’s subop-
timality concern. This model provides a foundation for the third group size maxim because





Gy, which grows with group size.
I next consider stylized representations of the public good contribution and commons
games to analyze Olson’s size propositions further. In Fig. 1a, five identical persons can
contribute one or no units of a pure public good at a per unit cost, ci, of 8. Each contributed
unit gives all five persons a benefit, bi, of 5. If individual i does not contribute, then i
receives 0 when no one else contributes. If, however, one person other than i contributes, i
gains 5. When two others privilege i with a free ride, then i gains 10. The other payoffs in
the top row are computed in a similar manner. If individual i contributes alone, then i nets
-3, which equals bi  ci. When i’s contribution is matched by two other contributors, then
i gains 3bi  ci ¼ 15  8 ¼ 7. The other payoffs in the bottom row of Fig. 1a are calcu-
lated in an analogous fashion. Notice that a summation aggregator applies, insofar as
benefits are multiplied by the number of contributors.
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The dominant strategy for the game in Fig. 1a is not to contribute since every payoff in
the top row is 3 greater than the corresponding payoffs in the bottom row. As individual i
and the four other individuals play their dominant strategies, the Nash equilibrium emerges
in which no one contributes. At this equilibrium, neither i nor any of the other individuals
unilaterally will change their strategies, given that 0[  3. The social optimum requires
everyone to contribute for an aggregate payoff of 85 ¼ 5  17ð Þ, which also represents the
amount of suboptimality associated with the Nash equilibrium, whose aggregate payoff is
0. The resulting game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD).
In Fig. 1b, an analogous open-access commons game is displayed, where now bi ¼ 8
and ci ¼ 5. If i refrains from grazing his or her cattle, then i’s payoff is -5 times the
number of ranchers using the commons. By exploiting the commons, a rancher imposes
public costs on others in return for a private benefit. This is the opposite of the contribution
game wherein the benefits are public and the costs are private (Sandler and Arce 2003).
When just rancher i grazes his or her cattle on the commons, i nets 3 as costs of 5 are
deducted from i’s benefits of 8. When i and one other rancher exploit the commons, then
each receives 2 ¼ 8  2  5ð Þ. The other payoffs follow in a similar fashion. The
dominant strategy in this PD game is for all five ranchers to graze their cattle on the
commons, thus resulting in per rancher losses of 17 for an aggregate loss of 85. Despite this
loss, i will not unilaterally switch to not grazing because 17[  20.
For the contribution game, there is no action; for the commons game, there is too much
action (Sandler and Arce 2003). In both cases, the desirable collective action fails to
emerge, and the extent of suboptimality increases with the size of the group, thereby
illustrating Olson’s first and third group size propositions. A summation aggregator, in
Number of contributors other than i 
  0 1 2 3 4 
→ i Does not contribute 
Nash   
0 5 10 15 20 
 i Contributes –3 2  7 12 
Social Optimum 
17 
Five-person contribution game, bi = 5, ci  = 8
Number of farmers other than i whose cattle graze in commons 
  0 1 2 3 4 
i Does not graze 
Social Optimum 
0 –5 –10 –15 –20 
→  i Grazes 3 –2 –7 –12 
Nash  
–17 
Five-person commons game, ci = 5, bi  = 8
a
b
Fig. 1 Five-person symmetric representations for contribution and commons games
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terms of benefits for the contribution game and in terms of costs for the commons game,
underlies these two canonical representations. In addition, Nash behavior is assumed.
Next I extend both games to N players. In Fig. 2, payoffs are measured on the vertical
axes, while the number of other contributors, n, is displayed on the horizontal axis. Two
linear functions, based on the previous contribution game, are depicted. The participation
payoff is denoted by p nþ 1ð Þ and the shirking payoff is denoted by s nð Þ.8 The participation
payoff corresponds to being a contributor when n others contribute. For p 1ð Þ, n ¼ 0 and the
representative player contributes alone for a net gain of bi  ci ¼ 3. For N  1 other
contributors, player i gains N  1ð Þbi þ bi  cið Þ ¼ 5N  8 when contributing, as dis-
played on the right-hand vertical axis. In-between payoffs for the participation relationship
are computed in a similar fashion for different values of n. Shirking gives the represen-
tative player a payoff of 5 times the number of contributors or s nð Þ ¼ 5n, which has a
maximum value of 5N  5 when all but i contributes. Player i shirks because
s nð Þ[ p nþ 1ð Þ for all values of n, leading to a Nash equilibrium at E, where no collective
action is undertaken. The extent of suboptimality equals N 5N  8ð Þ, which increases with
group size, thereby confirming Olson’s third group size proposition.
The five-person commons game is now extended to its N-person analogue in Fig. 3. For
bi ¼ 8 and ci ¼ 5, the participation payoff equals 3  5n, while the shirking payoff equals
5n. The left vertical intercept for the participation function is bi  ci ¼ 3, while this
intercept for the shirking function is 0. In contrast to the contribution game, both functions
are downward sloping and the participation payoffs exceed the corresponding payoffs for
shirking (i.e. not exploiting the commons) for all levels of n. The Nash equilibrium is at
point E, at which everyone exploits the commons to the detriment of the collective welfare.
This result is known as the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ (Hardin 1968). As group size
increases, the extent of suboptimality also increases and equals 5N þ 8 times N, since
each member loses 5N þ 8. Olson’s third group size proposition holds for an open-access
commons. Figures 2 and 3 display the dual nature of the contribution and commons games
in their purest forms (Sandler and Arce 2003), so that the relative positions and orientation







Fig. 2 N-person contribution
game
8 These payoff functions are discussed in Dixit et al. (2009).
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action in the contribution game and too much action in the commons. In the latter case, the
group forms too easily. This duality of the two games is shown later to reverse the
exploitation hypothesis.
5 Influence of other aggregation technologies on group size
In 1965, summation was the only aggregation technology assumed. We now know that
other aggregators do not necessarily support Olson’s size maxims. Consider a weakest-link
public good, such that the smallest contribution level determines the overall provision
level. If everyone is identical in terms of tastes and income, then everyone will desire the
same level of provision and will match one another’s contributions to the collective good.
It is as though each individual faces the social-optimizing problem. The resulting Nash
equilibrium is the social optimum, so that Olson’s third maxim for group size does not
hold—i.e. an increase in group size does not worsen suboptimality for weakest-link col-
lective goods for homogeneous individuals (Mueller 2003, pp. 22–25; Sandler 1992,
pp. 52–53).9 Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) confirmed this result in an experimental
setting. If, however, some individuals have lower incomes, then they may not be able to
afford the social-optimizing provision point and need help in terms of ‘‘shoring up’’ by
others (Vicary and Sandler 2002). With unequal incomes, suboptimality may arise for
weakest-link public goods, because shoring up implies a PD game, wherein rich countries
attempt to free ride on the shoring-up efforts of other rich countries (Sandler 2015).
Next consider a best-shot public good such that the largest contribution fixes the ag-
gregate provision level. Best-shot public goods weaken Olson’s first group size principle in
the case of unequal incomes. In this scenario, a rich contributor with strong preferences for
the good may privilege everyone regardless of group size. If US-sponsored effort by
GlaxoSmithKline to develop a vaccine for Ebola succeeds, then all countries or people will
benefit. The number of countries in need of the vaccine does not affect the discovery of the
vaccine. This is also true for efforts to isolate new microbes. The size of the group does not
necessarily inhibit the likelihood of being privileged, which instead depends on having a





E = −5N + 8
−5N + 5
Fig. 3 N-person commons game
9 At the Nash equilibrium, each contributor satisfies MRSiGy ¼ p. No free-rider benefits are available,
thereby requiring everyone to achieve this equality at the social-optimizing public good level.
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contributor, which is why best-shot public goods may have a more difficult time being
supplied at the local or regional level than at the global level.
As a final aggregator, I consider a discrete threshold public good, for which benefits
begin to accrue to group members only after a predetermined quantity of the good is
provided (Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984; Dixit and Olson 2000).
Suppose that benefits of 4 per contributed unit are received by each individual only after,
say, three units are contributed. The underlying game is initially assumed to have five
potential contributors, each of whom may contribute one or no units at a per unit cost of 5.
In this game, a cost-sharing structure also is assumed, wherein each of the five individuals
covers one-fifth of the cost per unit, no matter who provides the units. If there are, say, four
contributors n ¼ 4ð Þ, then each group member pays 5  4ð Þ=5 ¼ 4 in costs. The same also
is true for noncontributors.
The normal-form threshold game is depicted in Fig. 4. When the number of contributors
is below the threshold, each member pays -n in costs. In the top row, noncontributor i
must pay -1 and -2 when one or two others have contributed, respectively. Next consider
the case where the threshold is just met. In the bottom row, this occurs when i and two
others contribute, so that i nets 9 ¼ 3  4ð Þ  3½ . If i and three others contribute, then i
gains 12 ¼ 4  4ð Þ  4½ . The other payoffs are computed similarly. Two Nash equilibri-
ums exist for this assurance game, namely no one or everyone contributes (Runge 1984;
Sandler 1992). At these two equilibriums, i will not want to alter its strategy unilaterally. If
each individual in this game can be assured that the threshold is met, then each will want to
contribute.10 The full-participation Nash equilibrium is also the social optimum where
aggregate benefits are 75.
Figure 5 generalizes the game to N players with the same benefits per contributed unit,
cost per unit, threshold, and cost-sharing arrangement as in Fig. 4. Once the three-con-
tributor threshold is attained, the participation and shirking functions switch their relative
positions so that the participation payoff exceeds that of shirking. In consequence, the Nash
equilibrium is at E ¼ 3N. Below this threshold, the shirking payoff exceeds that of par-
ticipation, leading to a Nash equilibrium at E2 ¼ 0. A hallmark of assurance games is
multiple equilibriums that include both action and no action. The cost-sharing arrangement
means that the action equilibrium is a social optimum. Thus, this assurance game violates
the third group size maxim, because an increase in group size does not necessarily imply
Number of contributors other than i 
  0 1 2 3 4 
i Does not contribute 
Nash   
0 –1 –2 9 12 
 i Contributes –1 –2 9 12 
Nash 
15 
Five-person contribution game, bi = 4 after threshold of 3 contributors, ci  = 5n/N
Fig. 4 Five-person assurance game
10 If costs are not shared, then the resulting assurance game has 11 Nash equilibriums—the number of ways
that groups of 3 can be drawn from a group of 5 plus the zero contribution equilibrium (Palfrey and
Rosenthal 1984; Sandler 1992).
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greater suboptimality. In fact, as N becomes infinitely large, the participation payoff be-
comes more attractive relative to shirking since, prior to reaching the threshold, one’s share
of the cost approaches zero. This assurance game also speaks against the first group size
maxim—the possibility of group formation or being privileged is not necessarily inhibited
by group size because of cost sharing.
6 Group composition
Olson’s three group composition maxims are now considered.
6.1 Exploitation hypothesis
I focus on the exploitation hypothesis because recent interesting surveys of Logic have
little to say about this important maxim wherein the large is exploited by the small. There
are many situations where this maxim is not true. To accomplish my purpose, I must return




Ui yi;Gð Þjyi þ pG ¼ wi þ pGif g: ð5Þ
In (5), pGi (the value of spillovers) has been added to both sides of the budget
constraint in (1) and G replaces gi þ Gi. For a strictly increasing quasi-concave utility








Fig. 5 N-person assurance (threshold) game
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G ¼ max fi wi þ pGi; pð Þ;Gif g; ð6Þ
where G ¼ Gi if i is a noncontributor (Andreoni 1988; Bergstrom et al. 1986; Sandler and
Posnett 1991). For contributors, the demand for the public good, G, at a Nash equilibrium
is
G ¼ fi wi þ pGi; pð Þ; ð7Þ
where ofi=o wi þ pGið Þ lies between 0 and 1 owing to the assumed income normality of
the public good. Based on (7), contributor i’s demand is11
gi ¼ wi  w pð Þ½ =p; ð8Þ
where w pð Þ is the cutoff income for being a contributor, so that i contributes only when
wi[w pð Þ. Thus, only the richest group members contribute when tastes are identical but
incomes differ (Andreoni 1988; Andreoni and McGuire 1993; Bergstrom et al. 1986). This
representation supports the exploitation hypothesis for identical tastes, pure public goods,
income normal goods, and Nash behavior.
A simple refutation of the exploitation hypothesis follows if tastes for the public good
runs counter to income so that the poorer group members have the most interest in the
public good. Consider the Israeli-United States military alliance. Israel has a much greater
preference for its own defense in the Middle East where it has many enemies. As a
consequence, Israel typically spends a larger percentage of its gross domestic product
(GDP) on defense than its richer and larger ally, the United States.
The validity of the exploitation hypothesis may hinge on the underlying strategic as-
sumption in the case of a collective good. This can be established by reconsidering the
private provision of public good model under Nash and leader–follower assumptions. To
do so, I return to Eq. (2) and substitute the budget constraint into the utility function to give
Ui wi  pgi; gi þ Gið Þ ¼ Ui gi;Gi; p;wið Þ; ð9Þ
which depicts utility in terms of gi;Gi (spillovers), and the fixed parameters of price and
income. If the game involves just two individuals, i ¼ 1; 2; then (9) becomes
U1 g1; g2; p;w1ð Þ; ð10Þ
with a similar income-constrained utility function for individual 2 in terms of g1; g2; p; and
w2. The representation in (10) implies an iso-utility contour with slope
dg2
dg1
¼ 1 þ p
MRS1Gy
ð11Þ
by the implicit function rule. These contours can be displayed in g1; g2ð Þ space for given
price and incomes.
In Fig. 6, we display two of individual 1’s income-constrained, iso-utility contours, II
and I0I0. For individual 1, each such contour is U-shape and achieves a minimum,12 where
MRS1Gy ¼ p for a given level of g2. The reaction path, R1, in Fig. 6 connects these mini-
mums and represents individual 1’s best response for each g2 level (Sandler 1992). Indi-
vidual 2’s income-constrained, iso-utility contours have their minimums oriented to the
11 This follows by taking the inverse of both sides of (7) and by adding pgi to both sides. This then gives
f1i G
; pð Þ  pG ¼ wi  pgi . Finally, let w pð Þ equal the left-hand side and solve for gi .
12 At this minimum, dg2=dg1 ¼ 0, so that the stated equality follows.
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vertical axis as shown by curve ii in Fig. 6. Connecting these best-response points gives
individual 2’s reaction path R2. The intersection of these reaction paths is the Nash
equilibrium, N, where individual 2 contributes g2N and individual 1 contributes g1N . The
shaded lens-shaped region between the Nash equilibrium’s iso-utility contours for the two
individuals indicates the Pareto-improvement area wherein both individuals are better off
(i.e. achieve more utility) than at the Nash equilibrium. Even in the case of two individuals
and a summation aggregator, the Nash outcome is suboptimal.
In Fig. 7, the Nash equilibrium for a large agent L and a small agent F is indicated at N,
where the reaction paths intersect. It is easy to see that individual F contributes far less than
individual L at this equilibrium. Increases in L’s income would shift L’s reaction path to the
right (not shown), making for even greater inequity of burden sharing. The total contri-
bution at N is found by extending a line with slope -1 to the horizontal axis, giving GN as
this total. Next suppose that individual L is a leader and individual F is a follower. The
follower takes the leader’s contribution as given, thereby behaving no differently than for
the Nash representation. As such, RF represents F’s follower reaction path. The leader,
however, chooses its best iso-utility contour using RF as a constraint; hence, L picks point
S in Fig. 7 where its iso-utility contour is tangent to F’s reaction path. As a result, L’s
welfare improves and F’s welfare worsens compared to their respective iso-utility contours
through N. At this leader–follower equilibrium, the leader strategically shifts more of the
burden onto the follower and may reverse the exploitation.13 This stems from the leader














Fig. 6 Two-agent Nash contributor equilibrium
13 A corner solution is also possible with the follower providing all of the public good (Cornes and Sandler
1996, pp. 331–333).
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overall public good level falls from GN to GLF owing to the leader’s strategic behavior. The
important point is that alternatives to Nash behavior may reverse exploitation.
When Olson (1965) put forward his exploitation hypothesis, he had a collective good
and not a commons in mind. In a commons, the exploitation hypothesis is often reversed
with the small shouldering the crowding burden of the large (Sandler and Arce 2003;
Vicary 2009). Consider the normal-form game in Fig. 8 for two exploiters of a fishery—
small firm A with 5 vessels and large firm B with 10 vessels. Suppose that each vessel
imposes a public crowding cost of 5 and earns a gain of 8 per vessel for the firm. Based on
these costs and benefits, the payoffs in Fig. 8 follow for this PD. At the Nash equilibrium
the small firm loses heavily, while the large firm just makes a profit. Clearly, the small firm
shoulders the greater burden owing to other-generated crowding. In fact, this reversed
exploitation often holds for any congestion situation—e.g. two trucking firms sharing a free
highway.
6.2 Other group composition principles
Olson (1965) was optimistic that heterogeneous groups would achieve some collective
action as a rich individual privileges the rest of the group. This is clearly the case for the
private provision of a pure public good for homogeneous tastes, different incomes, Nash
behavior, and summation aggregation. For this scenario, Bergstrom et al. (1986) showed
that the richest individuals provide the public good. If, however, a weakest-link public
good is to be provided, then the richest individual must bring everyone’s contribution level















Fig. 7 Leader–follower behavior and reversed exploitation
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group with many poor individuals. In a recent article, Sandler (2015) established that this
may, at times, pose an insurmountable problem. Difficulties may be compounded among
capable contributors as they attempt to free ride on the largess of other capable con-
tributors, thereby leading to a PD. This worrisome scenario may apply to a quarantine
against a deadly disease that is indigenous to many poor countries. Consider what the 2014
Ebola outbreak would have been like if it had spread to all of Africa. Rich countries would
have needed to contain the disease throughout the continent, which would have taxed their
capabilities greatly. Coordination problems and the lack of healthcare workers posed
significant worries when Ebola was confined to a few Western African countries.
Another issue for Olson’s heterogeneous composition provision maxim involves benefit
rivalry or crowding. With sufficient crowding, large groups may not provide any of the
collective good, because the benefits per person are too small (Pecorino and Temimi 2008).
This may even be true for the richest individual for very large groups as crowding dis-
counts this individual’s benefits so that costs cannot be covered profitably. Esteban and
Ray (2001) and Pecorino and Temimi (2008) also showed the relative importance of
nonlinear costs and the crowding parameter for Olson’s group size maxims. Suffice it to
say that crowding has a role to play for many of Olson’s principles of collective action.
Olson’s final group composition maxim concerns the greater likelihood of homogeneous
groups forming. This maxim assumes implicitly that identical tastes and income curtail
participation costs. Dixit and Olson (2000) indicated that participation costs may be a real
concern for threshold public goods, wherein the right number of participants is required.
Dixit and Olson (2000) modeled the collective decision in two stages: stage 1 requires
individuals to decide to participate or not, while stage 2 involves bargaining over the
provision level.14 These authors showed that the likelihood of provision is extremely low
for large groups when the participation threshold is less than the group’s size. This
probability virtually goes to zero in the presence of participation costs. Olson himself was
not sanguine about his homogeneous composition principle for a threshold aggregator and
participation costs.
Other aggregation technologies may play havoc with this maxim. Consider a best-shot
scenario wherein homogeneity means that no one is willing to provide the best-shot public
good, because no group members are better endowed than others. This is a concern for
B 
0 vessels 10 vessels 
A 
0 vessels   0, 0    –50, 30 
5 vessels 15, –25 
Nash 
–35, 5 
Fig. 8 Reversed exploitation in
a commons
14 Dixit and Olson (2000) specifically related their exercise to Coasian bargaining to internalize an
externality.
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some regions of Africa or Asia when an extraordinary provision effort is required by an
indigenous country to confront a public health or other emergency.
Finally, imperfect information may work against this maxim for assurance games when
participants must be convinced that the right number of others will come forward. This
poses an information problem even for homogeneous group members, which is particularly
acute when a large number of participants are needed (Sandler 2015).
7 Institutional recommendations
Olson (1965) also offered institutional recommendations for addressing collective action
failures. He realized that private inducements or selective incentives may encourage col-
lective action. Consider the act of overthrowing a ruthless dictator, who would exact
horrible retribution on anyone who opposes his rule (Tullock 1974). Volunteers may still
come forward, driven, in part, by the anticipated glory or power after the ruler is deposed.
These volunteer-specific benefits are selective incentives that may bolster collective action
by making the volunteer’s perceived benefits outweigh the costs. Even a suicide terrorist
may be induced to make the ultimate sacrifice for the collective’s well-being owing to
selective incentives (e.g. martyrdom, family rewards, and camaraderie). Cornes and San-
dler (1994, 1996) demonstrated that selective incentives are most effective when they are
produced jointly with the public good and are complementary to it. The latter means that
the benefits derived from the associated private good increase with the level of the jointly
provided public good. For example, concert tickets, given to large contributors to the
symphony, increase in value as the orchestra’s quality improves, because of the enhanced
support. Sufficient complementarity may result in positively sloped reaction paths (Cornes
and Sandler 1994), so that individuals increase their contributions as others give more.
These selective incentives may be ineffective if they are perfect substitutes for the
public good and can be purchased independently. In this case, strong incentives to free ride
surface as individuals seek to purchase the selective private good on its own. Even when
purchased together, reaction paths for the jointly produced activity are negatively sloped
and some free riding occurs.
Olson (1965) viewed institutional design as a means for encouraging effective collective
action. This message also formed the foundation of Ostrom’s (1987, 1990) myriad con-
tributions to the study of institutionally-promoted collective action. In Logic, federated
structures were seen as a way to foster collective action in smaller local groups when those
groups are part of a larger institution. Olson’s work was instrumental in generating a
literature on institutional design. The trick was to engineer cheap-to-operate institutions
that altered incentives so that contributing was transformed into a dominant strategy (see,
e.g. Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Hardin 1982; Libecap 2014; Libecap and Wiggins 1984;
Ostrom 1990; Taylor 1987). For example, the standard PD game can often be addressed by
cost sharing.15 The United Nations funds its peacekeeping operations since 11 December
1973 from assessment accounts, by which member countries share the costs of such
missions (Solomon 2007). INTERPOL also is financed by cost shares imposed on member
countries. Homeowner associations in gated communities and condominiums share costs
for common grounds, infrastructure, and collectively consumed facilities. For threshold
public goods, refunds prior to the threshold being reached can foster the attainment of the
15 This holds if N[ ci=bi, where N is the group size.
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threshold because contributors assume no risks if total contributions fall short (Bagnoli and
McKee 1991; Sandler 2004).
Ostrom (2000) pushed the notion of evolving social norms as a means of curbing
overuse of the shared commons. Based on insights gained from laboratory experiments and
field studies, she viewed evolutionary game theory as fostering effective collective action.
Individuals exercising effective strategies emerge, survive, and multiply.
Two obvious impediments can arise to the use of institutional engineering as a means
for promoting more effective collective action. First, large transaction costs can wipe out
the gained efficiency stemming from the institutional innovations. For clubs, the partly
rival public good can be shared efficiently if use can be monitored finely and tolls charged
accordingly. Moreover, the exclusion mechanism must be virtually costless to operate
(Buchanan 1965; Sandler 2013). A costly mechanism may require coarse exclusion, in
which a membership fee is assumed and not a per unit utilization charge (Helsley and
Strange 1991). Coarse exclusion induces members to expand their use until their marginal
benefit is zero, thereby resulting in too much crowding. Second, multiple stages of in-
teraction may be required for some institutions, which may reduce efficiency. Dixit and
Olson (2000) showed this to be the case of consummating a Coasian bargain for a
threshold public good, wherein a participation decision stage preceded the bargaining
stage.
8 Myriad applications
The study of collective action remains relevant with new applications arising daily. Space
allows me only to highlight a few applications.
Many environmental challenges—climate change, ozone shield depletion, heavy metal
pollutants, and acid rain—represent global and regional collective action problems. Cli-
mate change has proven particularly difficult to address, with developing countries de-
manding that developed countries reduce their greenhouse gases (GHGs) while poorer
countries continue to grow their economies (Sandler 2004, 2015). Such countries as India
and China want to be spared from curbing their GHG emissions on equity grounds—i.e.
much of the GHGs accumulated in the atmosphere came from developed countries. The
developing countries’ demand poses a problem because these populous countries have the
fastest growing carbon footprints. Until now, the achievement of environmental collective
action relied on international treaties. For example, the Montreal Protocol on limiting
ozone-depleting substances has been very successful, because the production and con-
sumption of these substances were concentrated in relatively few countries, no country
benefited from a thinner ozone layer, the science of ozone layer depletion was known,
substitutes for ozone depleters were found, and restoring the ozone layer would take just
four to five decades (Sandler 2004). The control of sulfur-based acid rain has been suc-
cessful in Europe and elsewhere owing to effective abatement and the presence of
monitoring stations.
The rise of transnational terrorism presents many collective action concerns of varying
difficulty to solve (Sandler 2005). The elimination of terrorist safe havens has proven
especially difficult because even one or two safe-haven countries can annihilate the efforts
of other countries. Failed states or countries with ungovernable areas have proven to be the
most important safe havens (Lee 1988). Another collective action problem involves hos-
tage taking. Maintaining a global convention of not conceding to terrorists’ ransom
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demands is especially troublesome as some countries view some hostages as too important
to leave in captivity. Countries not adhering to a no-concession policy send a signal to
hostage takers that abducting the right hostage can be profitable. Concessions by one
country reduce the credibility of other countries’ stated no-concession policy. Another
terrorism-related collective action worry arises as targeted countries overspend on defen-
sive measures in an attempt to transfer terrorist attacks abroad, while these countries
underspend on purely public proactive measures as a way to free ride on the actions of
others (Arce 2013; Sandler 2005). Gathering intelligence on common terrorist threats
presents coordination problems that targeted countries do not address efficiently owing to
the public good aspects of intelligence. Ironically, terrorist groups appear to be more astute
than governments in managing their collective action concerns as these groups form net-
works to assist one another.
The overuse of antibiotics has led to antibiotic-resistant superbugs that pose dire
threats to current and future generations. The creation and control of superbugs rep-
resents an intergenerational collective action problem. Past and current generations
created the problem by overusing antibiotics, not using treatments as instructed, or
both. Moreover, the current generation needs to be sufficiently altruistic to future
generations to invest enough in the discovery of new antibiotics. The sequence of
generations means that future generations cannot meet and bargain with the current or
previous generations to use antibiotics responsibly. Many health-based collective action
issues possess an intergenerational component. Consider vaccinations to achieve herd
immunity to eradicate an infectious disease. Once a disease is eradicated, current and
future generations are protected and do not have to get booster shots. Even one country
can keep the world from obtaining herd immunity for some disease. As the threshold of
herd immunity is approached for some disease, incentives to get vaccinated are reduced
because the chance of becoming infected goes down. Hence, for herd immunity, in-
centives to act become less imperative from the individual viewpoint as the goal
becomes more attainable. Ironically, social incentives grow in importance as the
achievement of herd immunity nears the threshold. Such perverse incentives plague
other collective action problems.
Nuclear weapons proliferation is another bothersome collective action problem of
profound importance. This concern is particularly difficult to handle because peaceful uses
of nuclear reactors exist, thus the true intent of the suspected proliferator cannot be known
with certainty. Scientists in a nuclear country can supply needed information to countries
striving to develop nuclear weapons. Moreover, companies in other countries may supply
dual-use technologies and needed equipment for a profit, despite the negative externalities
imposed on others. Once a country nears or crosses the nuclear threshold, some powerful
country must assume the burden of destroying the proliferators’ nuclear capabilities. This
is usually done by the most-threatened country.
Protecting the biodiversity of the planet is another collective action problem with
intergenerational ramifications. Currently, the poaching of white rhinoceros in South
Africa is causing that species to face extinction unless countries come to the aid of
South Africa, which has not been able to stem the problem. One solution is to
transfer some of the endangered species to another part of Africa that is able to
protect against poaching. Many unique species and habitats are located in countries
without sufficient resources to preserve such precious assets unless assisted by other
countries. This need for shoring up or outside help raises a free-riding problem
associated with a PD game.
The list of collective action problems is long, varied, and growing.
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9 Concluding remarks
In his celebrated book, Olson (1965) set himself an impossible task to distill the principles
of collective action down to eight simple maxims that could capture all situations. The
strategic interactions involving collective action include substitutes and complements16 in
sequential, simultaneous, or repeated games. As such, no universal set of maxims can be
stated that capture the variety of utility functions, cost functions, aggregation technologies,
benefit rivalry, and participation costs.
By way of summary, Table 2 lists considerations that can invalidate Olson’s (1965)
maxims. For example, the provision of a best-shot public good is independent of group
Table 2 Selected factors working against Olson’s propositions
Size of group
Group size inhibits group formation
Coalition’s benefit share does not fall with group size
Aggregation technology (e.g. best shot)
Absence of participation costs
Increased group size and smaller provision
Income normality and pure public good
Exclusion mechanism and partial rivalry of benefits
Nonrivalry of collective benefits
Group size and suboptimality
Aggregation technology (weakest link, homogeneous tastes and endowments)
Collective club goods
Absence of complementary joint products
Group composition
Exploitation hypothesis: small exploiting the large
Some strategic assumptions (e.g. leader–follower behavior)
Commons problems or congestion problem
Agents’ preferences run counter to agents’ endowments
Heterogeneous group and some collective action
Aggregation technology (e.g. weakest link and unequal endowments)
Large rivalry of benefits
Homogeneous group are more apt to form
Presence of participation costs
Imperfect information
Aggregation technology (e.g. best shot)
Institutional recommendations
Selective incentives




16 The impact of leader-follower behavior on burden sharing and total output depends on the presence of
strategic substitutes or complements. Possible combinations are even richer when mixed cases are con-
sidered—see Arce and Sandler (2009).
214 Public Choice (2015) 164:195–216
123
size, provided that one sufficiently capable supplier privileges the group. Despite excep-
tions to Olson’s collective action principles, they remain valid in many essential stylized
cases—e.g. a pure commons or a pure public good—that represent numerous real-world
situations. His provocative maxims motivated 50 years of research, experiments, and
empirical studies that have sharpened everyone’s understanding of collective action. If his
propositions had been universally true, little of this research would have followed Olson’s
seminal work.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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